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ment of any other, in order to justify requiring a newsman to testify
before a grand jury.4"
The majority placed its hope in the proposition that law enforce-
ment agencies, in their own interest, will police themselves, or in the
alternative, that such a "hue and cry" will be raised that Congress and
the state legislatures will take remedial action. In this regard, the ma-
jority's point is well taken that of all "interest groups," the news media
are among the least defenseless. If anything will result in the awakening
of the power of the press against blind sponsorship of "law and order"
at the expense of constitutional rights, perhaps this decision will. And
perhaps the fear alone of such an awakening will deter the government
from any outlandish abuses of discretion. Meanwhile, if reporters seek
their' protection in the courtroom, they must be prepared to offer positive
proof that the government's grand jury is on a mere "fishing expedition,"
or that in some other way one of the seven enumerated offenses 44 violat-
ing the freedom of press is occurring.
The question unresolved by Branzburg, which leaves the criteria for
freedom of the press somewhat uncertain, is whether trial and appellate
courts will truly take such applications for judicial protection on a case-
by-case basis, or whether, in avoiding a solid shield of protection for all
confidential relationships, the Supreme Court has left the news media in
the exposed and unprotected position feared by the dissent.45
DOUGLAS K. SILVIS
DISCRIMINATORY JURY SELECTION: REVERSIBLE ERROR
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S OWN RACE
Petitioner, a white male, was indicted and convicted for burglary.'
No member of either the grand jury which indicted him or the petit jury
which convicted him was black. In a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief, he raised the claim that discriminatory jury selection practices
were used and that blacks were thereby systematically excluded from
these bodies.2 On the basis of this exclusion, the petitioner claimed that
43. Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972).
44. See note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
45. The dissent, per Mr. Justice Stewart, expressed the fear that "[tihe court...
invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by
attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government." 92
S. Ct. at 2671.
1. This action has a long and involved history. Petitioner was tried twice for this
offense. The first trial resulted in a conviction that was reversed on appeal on fourth
amendment grounds. Peters v. State, 114 Ga. App. 595, 115 S.E.2d 647 (1966). On retrial,
petitioner was again found guilty. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. Peters v. State,
115 Ga. App. 743, 156 S.E.2d 195 (1967).
2. A previous petition was denied for failure to exhaust then-available state remedies.
Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968).
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his conviction violated the fourteenth amendment guarantees of due pro-
cess and equal protection. The state contended that, since the petitioner
himself was not black, he had not personally suffered unconstitutional
discrimination. The petition was denied in the federal district court, and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.3 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded: A state can
not, consistent with due process, subject a defendant to indictment by a
grand jury or trial by a petit jury which has been selected in an arbitrary
and discriminatory manner contrary to federal constitutional and statu-
tory requirements. Peters v. Kiff, 92 S. Ct. 2163 (1972).
In Peters, the Court was faced with two main issues. The first was
whether a white defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of
blacks from jury service. The second was whether the petitioner would
be entitled to any relief on the basis of that constitutional violation with-
out a showing of actual bias. The Court answered both of these questions
in the affirmative.
In passing United States Code, title 18, section 243, which makes it
a crime for a public official to exclude anyone from a grand or petit jury
solely on the basis of race, Congress determined that such exclusion is a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, the Court reasoned that a violation occurs whether the defen-
dant is a member of the excluded group or not. "[T]he existence of a
constitutional violation does not depend on the circumstances of the per-
son making the claim."4
Fortunately for the petitioner, the proof of unconstitutional exclu-
sion was overwhelming. A previous decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had examined the jury selection system of Muscogee
County, Georgia, the site of petitioner's trial, and had found that system
to be defective.' That court held that the disparity between the adult
population of Muscogee County, which was 30% black, the tax digests,
showing 14% blacks, and jury lists containing only 3/4 of 1% blacks
was so great that the system was totally defective, regardless of whether
the exclusion was intentional.
The court of appeals also found that the same procedure was being
used for both grand and petit jury selection and, therefore, any finding
of unconstitutional exclusion would apply to both bodies. Since these
findings were contemporaneous with petitioner's trial, the court suggested
that they be held conclusive as far as the petitioner's claim was con-
cerned. The Supreme Court appears to have accepted this suggestion,
since its holding recognized as fact, the finding of discriminatory selec-
tion practices.
Despite the constitutional violation, there remained the question of
3. Peters v. Kiff, 441 F.2d 370 (5th cir. 1971).
4. 92 S. Ct. at 2166.
5. Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 369 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1966).
1972)
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whether the petitioner was entitled to relief on the basis of that violation.
The state contended that a defendant must introduce affirmative evidence
of actual harm in order to establish a basis for relief.
The Court had never before considered a white defendant's claim
of prejudice allegedly caused by the exclusion of another racial group
from a jury. The majority of lower courts that had considered the ques-
tion had declared it a necessary prerequisite that the defendant be a
member of the excluded race.' All previous cases decided by the Supreme
Court had involved juries which excluded members of the defendant's
own race. In those cases, the right to challenge exclusion rested on a pre-
sumption that a jury so constituted would be prejudiced against a defen-
dant of the excluded race. For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia,7
the first case concerning discriminatory jury selection, the black defen-
dant was convicted by a jury from which blacks were excluded by statute.
The Court held that "every citizen of the United States has a right to a
trial of an indictment against him by a jury selected and impaneled with-
out discrimination against his race or color, because of race or color .... "I
Strauder, along with Virginia v. Rives' and Ex Parte Virginia,0 was part
of a landmark trilogy of cases. Virginia v. Rives concerned a black de-
fendant's challenge to the lack of blacks in the venue from which his jury
was drawn, while Ex Parte Virginia dealt with a challenge to a statute
making it illegal to exclude blacks from grand or petit juries. Since all
three cases involved black defendants, the Court was able to decide the
cases on the narrow basis of equal protection for blacks under the four-
teenth amendment.
Although actual injury had always been shown in earlier decisions,
the Court found that additional constitutional values were involved in
the present case. In so doing, the majority relied on cases such as Strau-
der, which had held that "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body of men
composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected
or summoned to determine . . . ."" In Williams v. Florida,12 the Court
stated that jury selection should entail obtaining a representative cross-
section of the community.'8 Additionally, in Ballard v. United States14
6. 92 S. Ct. at 2165 n.4.
7. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
8. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
9. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
10. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
11. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
12. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
13. The purpose of the jury trial, as we noted in Duncan, is to prevent oppression
by the Government . . . Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation
and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence . . . . [T]he number [of jurors] should probably be large enough to
promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to
provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the com-
munity.
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
14. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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the Court stated that the statutes relating to the qualifications for the
choosing of jurors reflect a design to make the jury a truly representative
cross-section of the community.'5 Therefore, the Peters Court concluded
that purposeful and systematic exclusion is a departure from the scheme
of jury selection which Congress adopted, and is, therefore, in violation
of the sixth amendment. 6 However, since neither the fifth amendment
right to a grand jury,17 nor the sixth amendment right to a petit jury 8
restricts state action, the Court decided the case on other grounds.
The Court maintained that the due process right to a competent and
impartial tribunal is quite separate from the right to any particular form
of proceeding. If a state chooses, quite apart from constitutional com-
pulsion, to use a grand or petit jury, due process imposes limitations on
the composition of that jury. "Illegal and unconstitutional jury selection
procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process. They
create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual cases, and
they increase the risk of actual bias as well."' 9
However, in the case of a white defendant, was there actual bias,
or was the exclusion of blacks from a jury a type of harmless error? The
Court held that the impact of such an exclusion is too subtle and too per-
vasive to limit its effect to particular issues or cases.2 ° As the Court had
previously stated in Ballard v. United States,
reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in
an individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an
eligible class or group in the community in disregard of the
prescribed standards of jury selection.2 '
In light of the great potential for harm latent in an unconstitutional
jury selection system, any doubt as to the existence of prejudice should be
resolved in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, the Court held that
"whatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the
15. The American tradition of trial by jury . . . necessarily contemplates an im-
partial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community . . . . This does not
mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic,
social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the community ....
But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without
systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.
Id. at 192-93, citing Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
16. 92 S. Ct. at 2167.
17. Under Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the fifth amendment right to a
grand jury indictment does not apply to a state prosecution.
18. The right to a jury trial, made applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), was held nonretroactive in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
Petitioner's trial occurred before Duncan and, therefore, he had no established constitu-
tional right to a jury trial.
19. 92 S. Ct. at 2168.
20. [T]he opportunity to appeal to race prejudice is latent in a vast range of issues,
cutting across the entire fabric of our society.
v * . It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently
vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that their exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in
any case that may be presented.
Id. at 2169.
21. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (citation omitted).
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system used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbi-
trarily excludes from service the members of any race, and thereby denies
him due process of law."'22
In a concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Brennan
and Powell, Justice White circumvented.the problem of due process by
contending that there had been a statutory violation. Enacted March 1,
1875, United States Code, title 18, section 243 (1970) states:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may
be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand
or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude ...
Accordingly, where citizens are disqualified from jury service on the
grounds of race, a constitutional and statutory violation is involved. Thus,
as the Supreme Court had previously held in Hill v. Texas,23 no state may
impose upon one convicted of a crime a trial procedure which the Con-
stitution and an act of Congress passed pursuant to the Constitution
forbid.
Where, as in this case, timely objection has laid bare a discrim-
ination in the selection of grand jurors, the conviction cannot
stand, because the Constitution prohibits the procedure by
which it was obtained. Equal protection of the laws is something
more than an abstract right. It is a command which the state
must respect, the benefits of which every person may demand. 4
Therefore, although the Court had never before set aside a convic-
tion for arbitrary exclusion of a class of citizens from jury service where
the defendant was not a member of the excluded class, Justice White
reasoned that under the broad sweep of Hill v. Texas, and the statutory
command of section 243, the court had the power to do so.
While perhaps reaching a desirable result in this particular case,
the Court seems to have discounted several factors. Probably the most
questionable part of the decision, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out in
his dissent, is the holding that illegality in jury selection procedures
necessarily voids a criminal conviction despite the absence of any demon-
stration of prejudice. It appears that while the Court has effectively
found a way to dispel the spectre of discriminatory jury selection prac-
tices, it may have done so at too great a cost. This decision may open the
door for a new area of appeal in that defendants, relying on this decision,
can now claim bias due to a discriminatory action unrelated to their class
or claim. The mere showing of such improper action by the selecting body
will now be sufficient proof to require a finding of reversible constitu-
tional error.
IRA C. POLLACK
22. 92 S. Ct. at 2169.
23. 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
24. Id. at 406.
